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Keshab Bhattarai (UK) 
Taxes, public spendings and economic growth in OECD countries 
Abstract 
Impacts of taxes and spending on accumulation and growth are assessed theoretically using neoclassical, optimal 
growth and overlapping generation models. Empirical supports based on rank correlation and panel regression analysis 
suggest that countries with higher tax GDP ratio generally had lower growth rates compared to those with lower ratio 
in OECD when examined the period from 1991 to 2006. The country and time specific factors seem to play more 
prominent role than the taxes. Country specific differences have their historical roots as collective preferences, con-
straints on sizes and modalities of public goods and services and willingness to pay for them, the optimal size of pri-
vate sectors and the desire for economic freedom are influenced by those factors. Time specific factors owe to interna-
tional business cycles. Real factors including the rate of capital formation, human capital and technology are more 
important for growth than the tax rates as higher tax rates are associated with higher rate of public services. Negative 
effects of taxes are often compensated by positive effects of public goods, thus, leaving a very small net negative im-
pact on growth.  
Keywords: taxes, spending, growth, OECD.
JEL Classification: D90, H20, H50, P35. 
Introduction1
Millions of working men and women in OECD 
countries pay local and national taxes on their labor, 
capital or other incomes and on consumption. They 
receive public goods and services including health, 
education, unemployment insurance, pension and 
social security or income subsidy from national and 
local public institutions. Ratios of revenue and pub-
lic spending to GDP vary enormously across these 
countries due to the generousness of the social secu-
rity system or the rates of economic growth. 
Consider few relevant facts. The republic of Ireland 
grew impressively by 7.9 percent during 1994-2004 
maintaining revenue and spending ratios just around 
35 percent of GDP; South Korea had about 5 per-
cent annual growth rate during that period with even 
smaller public sector of around 31 percent of its 
GDP. In contrast, Japan grew only by 1.2 percent, 
despite a large public sector deficit, which separated 
its revenue and spending ratios by a whopping 7 
percent of its GDP (30.3 and 38.2 percent, respec-
tively). Sweden had about the same rate of growth 
of 2.8 percent as in UK despite having about 17 
percent higher revenue GDP ratio than that of UK. 
In contrast, growth rate of Denmark was just 2.1 
percent with the relative size of the public sector 
even larger than that of Sweden. Sources of revenue 
and sectors of public spending vary in their nature 
and magnitudes among them. About 59 percent of 
public spending was classified as social spending 
for Germany but only 18 percent for Korea.  
Why are the sizes of public sector and growth rates 
so different among these countries? How far do the 
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variations in the sizes of public sector explain varia-
tion in their growth rates? 
The first one is a political economic question that 
relates basically to the freedom of choice of individ-
ual citizens in these countries between private and 
public goods. From very ancient times states have 
been raising public funds to provide public goods. 
Tax rate was six percent of income even in ancient 
India as in Europe. Sizes of governments have in-
creased as the responsibilities of states have risen 
out of proportions. Enough debates have taken place 
regarding the optimal size of the government (Pig-
ou, 1947; Samuelson, 1954; Buchanan, 1965; Atk-
sinson and Stern, 1974; Feldstein, 1974; Whalley, 
1975; Boadway, 1979; Summer, 1980; Blomquest, 
1985; Bovenberg, 1989; Benabou, 2002; Taveres, 
2004; Fullerton and Heutel, 2007; Chen, 2007). In 
more modern times classical or new classical econ-
omists favored a smaller size of government that 
only focuses on providing pure public goods, such 
as national defence and internal law and order. The 
Keynesians or new Keynesians implicitly have ar-
gued for larger economic roles for public sectors to 
stabilize economy from vagaries of market fluctua-
tions. There is extensive literature: Pareto optimal-
ity, Benthamian utilitarian analyses on social wel-
fare, Arrows’ impossibility theorem of equity and 
efficiency by means of voting mechanism or the 
Rawalsonian principle of social justice judged from 
the welfare of the lowest income person to Little-
Mirrlees principles of social cost benefit analyses. 
These entrust public authorities as guarantor of effi-
ciency in resource allocation and in bringing rea-
sonable amount of equity of income among citizens 
by means of tax and transfer mechanism. They rec-
ommend proper use of public funds in providing 
kind benefits and other public goods. In its extreme 
version, in Marxist or communists thinking, state is 
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at the forefront of economic management in which 
governments of proletariats take control over almost 
every economic decision. State owns most of the 
assets and reaps their profits, uses them in creating 
monolith infrastructure irrespective of demand of 
the consumers. In contrast, consumers are sovereign 
in the capitalist system where almost all productive 
activities are guided by invisible hands of market 
prices that provide enough signals to producers who 
supply various commodities that enter into con-
sumption baskets of individuals. Only pure public 
goods are provided by the state. Despite this theo-
retical dichotomy, both private and public sectors 
remain active in reality for providing commodities 
and services in almost all countries. Therefore, a 
clear view on principles of optimal size of public 
sector, optimal taxation and public spending and 
factors is not only relevant for a major political 
parties contesting for power or running a govern-
ment but also for economic and political thinkers who 
are active in theorizing on optimal size of the govern-
ment with sufficient degree of individual freedom.  
Fig. 1. Distribution of average tax rates among OECD countries, 1994-2005 
Fig. 2. Average tax rates among OECD countries, 1994-2005  
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The next question relates to the impact of public 
sector on economic growth. All kinds of taxes are 
distortionary on the one side and they create public 
goods and economic infrastructure on the other. 
Which one of these two effects is stronger is not 
clear at all. Is the larger size of public sector neces-
sarily harmful for economic growth? Do the bene-
fits generated by public goods compensate enough 
for the distortions? What levels of public services 
generate enough infrastructures and maintain 
good incentives required for a healthy economy? 
How can one make collections of taxes and allo-
cations of spending more effectively? What are 
the criteria for efficient amounts of surplus, defi-
cit or debt? Ideas of Harberger (1962), Uzawa 
(1962), Cass (1965), Atkinson (1971), Goulder 
and Summers (1989), King and Rebelo (1993), 
Perroni (1995), Cummins, Hasset and Hubbard 
(1996), Rust and Phelan (1997), Dhillon, Perroni 
and Scharf(1999), Wagstaff (1999), Caucutt, Im-
rohoroglu and Kumar (2006), Krueckner (2006), 
Di Tella and MacCullock (2006) have further 
illuminated on this debate. 
The major aim of this paper is to explain why there 
are differences in the patterns and structure of reve-
nue and spending in the OECD countries and to 
assess economic impact of these choices on eco-
nomic growth. Such analysis can provide an evi-
dence based assessment on the likely impacts of the 
reduction of average tax rate from 22 to 20 pence and 
corporate tax rates from 30 to 28 pence from April 
2008 in UK and subsequent policies on spending and 
revenue sides to fight recession adopted in April 2009. 
Can these steps towards less distortion be expected to 
bring higher rates of economic growth? Impacts of 
taxes and spending on accumulation and growth are 
assessed theoretically using neoclassical, optimal 
growth and overlapping generation models with em-
pirical support based on rank correlation analysis.  
1. Economic factors determining the size of the 
public sector 
Markets underprovide goods with positive external-
ities, such as education, health street lights or public 
gardens, and overproduce goods with negative ex-
ternalities such as transportation by polluting vehi-
cles and traffic congestions or outputs with higher 
amount of carbon footprints in industrial production. 
Optimal provision of public goods with positive and 
negative externalities and maintaining the social 
justice through redistribution are theoretical justifi-
cation for the existence of the public sector. There 
seems to be a great difference in this optimal size of 
the public sector across countries because of histori-
cal reasons. Perceptions of individuals vary across 
countries regarding the degree of risk aversion and 
the extent of such market failure and hence, need for 
state intervention in economic activities and need 
for the government that aims to ensure equity, effi-
ciency and stability, using various tax and spending 
strategies. For instance, the 2007 budget for the UK 
aimed to bring prosperity and fairness for families 
by maintaining a stable economy, promoting enter-
prises, innovations and skills, creating employment 
opportunities for all, providing high quality public 
services and protecting the environment. It aimed to 
strengthen an egalitarian society by maintaining a 
competitive economy.  
How much of semi-public goods, such as education 
and health, should be provided by state really de-
pends on preferences of individual and the budget 
constraint faced by each individual. Economists 
have used utility maximizing models to solve the 
question regarding the various size of public sector 
in an economy (Pigou, 1947; Samuelson, 1954; 
Atkinson and Stern, 1974 as illustrated in Figure 1; 
see texts, such as Boadway, 1984; Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1980; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; 
Myles, 1995; Muller, 1991; Shoven and Whalley, 
1992; and Hillman, 2003). 
Consider a problem of a representative household in 
an economy, as in a problem section of Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1980), which gains utility from the 
consumption of public goods and the net of tax in-




where hU  is the utility of households, hh TY  is 
the net of tax income, G is the public good and  is 
the weight in utility from consumption of public 
goods. The production side of the economy is repre-
sented here by income for simplicity. When the 
desire for public goods is linearly related with the 
level of income the decision of a median voter de-
termines the level of public good to be provided in 
an economy. When representative voter determines 
the size of the optimal public sector, then this prob-
lem can be applied to the economy as a whole. 
Market clears and total output is consumed either 
by the private or the public sector. Forming the 
constrained optimization problem, the Lagrangian 
function is given by 
GPYIGTYGYL hhhh lnln1, .
Then the first order conditions can be used to find the 
optimal amount of public spending in this economy. 
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With a representative median voter facing a lump-
sum tax of T, the total public good for the economy 
is PTPTG h  . Using this information in the first 
order condition the demand for public good by each 
individual is given by Y
P
G
. It is possible to im-
agine a distribution of  across countries giving a 
distribution of the size of the state. 
From this result we can say that it is optimal to have 
a large public sector if there are more preferences 
for public good among citizens of a country. Very 
high presence of public good seen in Scandinavian 
countries and Germany is indicative of preferences 
of households. Similarly, countries with lower ,
such as Mexico or Korea, rely more on private sec-
tors rather than on public sector for providing semi 
public goods. These results can be represented by a 
single peaked utility function, as shown in Figure 3. 
Utility from public sector spending (disutility of 
taxes) is higher (lower) for lower levels of public 
spending. Net benefit, that is significant in the be-

















Fig. 3. Optimal size of the public sector 
The efficient amount of public good is Go that max-
imizes the utility of the medial voter at point A’. G1 
amount of public good is too little and G2 amount is 
too much. Preferences for public goods have their 
historic origin. Some economies like to have more 
public goods than others. Gradual process of social 
transformation in Europe after the Magna Carta 
(1215) and successive reforms before and after the 
Industrial Revolution have produced more liberal 
constitutions made by majority of workers in Euro-
pean economies. These countries are more inclined 
to more egalitarian distribution and greater size of 
public spending. US constitution in contrast was 
formulated by group of wealthy and business 
minded people, therefore, it has resulted in less pro-
vision by state. Health care is public good in most of 
the Europe but mostly a private good in the United 
States. There are similar parallels in the education 
sector. Thus, heterogeneity of preferences for public 
goods has led to variation in the amount of the pub-
lic good provided across OECD economies. As Ar-
rows impossibility theorem has shown, the majority 
voting rule does not generate a unique equilibrium 
with public goods. When people are free to choose 
there is a tendency for free riding. 
In Lindhal equilibrium individuals pay according to 
the marginal benefit they receive from public ser-
vices but enjoy the same amount of public good. 
Law of diminishing marginal utility applied to the 
amount of public good – a given amount of public 
good generates various amount of benefit to various 
people. Therefore, first best solution is to charge 
according to marginal values. For instance, consider 
an amount of public good equal to G . Then order 
utilities from (taxes paid for) public goods for each 
individual are as follows 
NN TGMUTGMUTGMU ...2211 . Then 






. As it is difficult to obverse the mar-
ginal benefit of each individual, the second best 
solutions need to be designed in practice. Such equi-
librium results from second best instruments, such 
as the lump sum taxes where the consumption of 
public good varies among people though they pay 
the same amount of taxes.  
Utility,  disutility and net utility of public sector
Disutility from tax
Utility from spending






Fig. 4. Costs and benefits from the public spending
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It is possible to show the Pareto optimality condition 
for optimal allocation of private and public goods 
among two individuals using a popular model by 
Samuelson, which states that sum of the marginal 
rate of substitution between private and public 
goods by two individuals should equal the marginal 
cost of provision of public goods in equilibrium 
using the utility possibility frontier approach as 
GxuuMax ,111
subject to  1) Gxuu ,222 ,
         2) 2121 wwGcxx .
Lagrangian of the problem: 
212122211 ,, wwGcxxuGxuGxuL .



































































GMCMRSMRS 21  Q.E.D. 
Apparently, there seems to be a big difference on 
how people evaluate benefits and costs from the public 
sector. Countries that have many citizens with higher 
valuation of public services have larger public sectors, 
and countries with smaller number of citizens with 
higher valuation of public services have lower public 
sectors. This is clear from analysis of data. There is 
hardly any difference in pure government consumption 
to GDP ratio across OECD countries. There is a big 
disparity in social security payments. More egalitarian 
countries have more socialist distribution compared to 
more capitalist countries. Proportional or progressive 
tax systems in line with Mirrlees (1971) can be de-
signed to approximate the first best solution that 
matches the preferences for public goods to tax pay-
ments and for efficient allocation of public resources. 
2. Impact of taxes on economic growth 
Do differences in the size of public revenue and 
spending explain differences in their growth 
rates? To what extent do choices of public reve-
nue and spending policies matter for growth 
rates? This issue is analyzed below using three differ-
ent models: 1) a neoclassical growth model with con-
stant rate of saving functions for workers and capital-
ists as presented in Feldstein (1974); 2) Ramsey model 
with taxes in optimal growth framework, and; 3) a 
version of overlapping generation model as popular-
ized by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).  
Starting point for the neoclassical growth model is 
a production function: 
kfy .
Optimality requires that the gross factor price 
needs to equal the marginal product. In the pres-
ence of capital income tax the gross of tax returns 
on capital needs to equal the marginal productiv-
ity of capital as: 
trf 1'  [note: dttftdkfdr 21 1'1'' ]. 
Remaining of the output is paid to the labor. 
wkfy ' .
Deeper thinking about how much share of income 
should go to capital and how much to labor brings 
us to the deep socio-political economic debate 
that has occurred on many phases of revolutions 
and reforms over at least a century. In most Euro-
pean countries working class was able to put for-
wards its demands for minimum wages, safety 
and security over the capitalists giving rise to 
socialist pattern of distribution with a significant 
proportion of income used as taxes and transfers, 
as seen in these economies. Capitalist ideas got 
more importance in terms of protecting private 
ownership and more competitive market economy 
in the US or Japan. Despite this, economists gen-
erally agree that more efficient allocation of re-
sources requires payments to the factor of produc-
tion according to their marginal productivities. 
This is the fundamental mechanism of allocation 
of scarce inputs in all OECD countries. 
By market clearing assumption total of consump-
tion, investment and government spending equal 
aggregate output. Income and expenditure balance 
needs to be maintained.  
stkfcgicy ' .
In the long run, revenue and spending of govern-
ment sector are balanced, 'tkfg , and the steady 
equilibrium requires saving equal to investment. 
With n rate of population growth and no deprecia-
tion equal investment just nk.
nks .
The wage earners and profit (interest) earners save 
at different rates
rkrSwwSs KL
net investment equals available saving in the steady state. 
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11
1''1'' tkfSkfSfStkfrSkffwSnk KLLKL .
Impact of tax on accumulation and growth can be studied by taking the total differentiation of this equation 










Replacing the n term dr
































Thus, the impact of taxes on capital income in accu-
mulation not only depends on the tax rate but also on 
the marginal productivity of capital and its rate of de-
cline, propensities of saving from capital and labor 
incomes, their relations as shown above as output de-
pends on per capita income kfy  and capital 
stock accumulates in response to the investment 
ttt nkkk 1  fundamentally at the rate of popula-
tion growth rate. Many simplifying assumptions be-
hind this model – particularly fixed saving rate from 
wage and capital income  are relaxed in Ramsey’s 
optimal growth model. 
2.1. Optimal Ramsey model for decentralized 
economy. An individual maximizes total life time 









subject to boundary constraints on capital, oK  and 
TK  as well as an exogenous process of growth of 
labor ntoT eLL  and the technology tA . Firms 




law of motion of capital, ttt IKK 11 , ter-
minal condition TT KgI , and marginal pro-
ductivity principal of optimal rewards 
ktt tKAtr 11
1 ; government balances its 
account by balancing spending to revenue from 
capital income tax, 
tktt KtKAt
G 11 . The 





should clear in aggregate, so that total supply 
equals total demand, tttt ICYG . In steady 
state of this model 11 r  the interest equals 
the subjective discount factors. In this problem 
with exogenous process of technology, capital is 
the state variable and consumption is the control 
one. By substituting all the model elements the 














The transitional dynamics can be calculated by iterative solution of the Euler equation using the initial con-
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where ktt tKAt
r 111 . The impact of 
taxes on output, capital, investment and consump-
tion is very obvious. This model can be calibrated 
with the country specific parameters for each 
OECD economy. 
2.2. Impact of taxes in an overlapping generation 
model. Economic behaviors of young and old gen-
erations differ significantly and have impacts on 
growth and equilibrium. Both neoclassical and 
Ramsey models did not distinguish generations. The 
transition dynamics in the neoclassical model is 
given by the law of motion of the capital stock. 
Consider an economy inhibited by N number of 
individuals. In period 0 each of them is endowed by 
k0 capital stock and aggregate capital stock is K0.
The level of technical know how is denoted by A.
Production technology is standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
1
tLtAKtY . This im-
plies per capita output to be ttt kAy . Let the 
labor force 
t
L be fixed to N in each period. The 










. Labor is paid 








are two types of people living in this economy, 
young and old. Young people work and earn labor 
income and consume an  fraction of income 
tyt wc  and save 1  for their old age. The life 












. The old people earn 
interest in their asset and consume all of their in-
come, 
kttot trac 11 . The capital stock of 
period t results from the saving of old people; 
tt wa 11 . Next periods capital stock equals 
the assets saved today as given by the equation of 
accumulation: 
wttwt tkAtwtK 111 111
.
Aggregate saving equals total output minus the con-
sumption of young and old, this also is the market 
clearing condition in this model 
totyttt NgNcNcYS . Saving equals invest-
ment in each period tt IS  and investment adds to 
the capital stock
ttt KKI 1 . The public sector bal-
ances ktttwtttt tkALtkARG
11 . Study-
ing the transitional dynamics of this model it is ob-
vious that higher tax rates on wage and capital in-
come not only reduce the level of welfare of both 
young and old generations but also reduce the 
amount of accumulation of the economy if the 
public goods do not contribute towards the pro-
duction process.  
Impacts of capital income taxes on growth can be 
even higher in the analytical framework of endoge-
nous growth model. It is obvious if seen using 






come tax reduces growth and accumulation as much 
as lowers the savings of households who face the 
higher taxes and lower rate of productivity of capital 
and may prefer to consume more in the current pe-
riod rather than saving for future. Rebelo (1991) has 
found the welfare impacts of taxes to be more than 
40 times higher in the endogenous model rather than 
in a standard neoclassical model. 
3. Empirical evidence 
Above claims on size of public sector and growth 
are tested here using the real world data for OECD 
economies. A rank correlation analysis between the 
economic growth, ratios of public sector revenues 
and spending to GDP clearly establishes negative 
association between growth rates and size of the 
public sector in the study period, as shown in Table 
1. These estimates clearly show negative correlation 
between growth rates and the ratios of revenue and 
spending to the GDP, whereas the correlation is as 
expected between revenue and spending. The larger 
the public sector, the smaller the marginal benefit of 
public spending will be and the better the probabili-
ties that resources will have higher productivity in 
the private sector. There seem to be significant cross-
country negative and positive correlations in tax rates 
and growth rates among 29 OECD economies, as re-
ported in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.  
Table 1. Correlations between ranks of growth rates, 
revenue and spending 
  Rank-growth Rank-rev Rank_spend 
Rank-growth 1   
Rank-rev -0.19022 1  
Rank_spend -0.24028 0.900189 1 
Model discussed thus far did not take account of 
public goods into consideration while evaluating 
the adverse consequences of tax revenue. The 
distortionary impacts of taxes can be compensated 
if resources are used well in providing the public 
goods positive externalities in consumption and 
production. More recent models have attempted to 
include public goods funded by tax revenue not 
only in the consumer’s utility but also in the pro-
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duction function (Bergstrom, 2003; Dhillon et al., 
2007). All these theoretical models are helpful in 
abstract reasoning but policy makers and practi-
tioners require more elaborate assessment of the 
economy. Full general equilibrium analysis on 
how various forms of taxes affect an economy can 
be very complicated. Dynamic general equilib-
rium models are often solved numerically to as-
sess impacts of public sector activities and policy 
choices on output, income, employment, labor 
supply, levels of welfare and distribution of 
income and wealth among households over 
years. These can be found in Fullerton, Shoven 
and Whalley (1983), Bovenberg (1989), Goul-
der and Summers (1989), Summers (1980), 
Rebelo (1991), Perroni (1995), Bhattarai (2008), 
Benabou (2002), Caucutt, Imrohoroglu and 
Kumar (2006).  
Source: OECD. 
Fig. 5. Growth rates, tax revenue and spending, 2004 
3.1. Variations in the size and structure of rev-
enue. OECD governments receive most of their 
revenue from direct taxes on personal or corporate 
income or indirect taxes on consumption of goods 
and services and their structure varies enormously 
across countries. Some rely more on income or 
corporate taxes, which are generally regarded 
more progressive as they are mostly paid by richer 
section of the society, while still many other 
countries rely on indirect value added taxes 
(VAT) on consumption of goods and services, 
which are considered more regressive as both rich 
and poor households pay equally on the basis of 
their consumption. Higher income taxes discour-
age labor supply and, hence, cause reduction in 
production; higher corporate taxes discourage 
investment and, hence, capital formation. Higher 
consumption taxes may distort incentives for sav-
ing. Given these considerations it is not unnatural 
to see significant variations across countries in the 
sources of revenue, as shown in Figure 2. 
3.2. Panel data analysis. Panel data on growth rate 
and tax rates for 29 OECD countries are constructed 
from the OECD data set available from 
www.mimas.ac.uk/esds international. Details on 
growth rates and tax rates are provided for individ-
ual economies in by time series charts of growth 
rates and tax rates in the Appendix. Empirical 
analyses from these panel data in the form of regres-
sion of growth rate of OECD countries on their tax 
to GDP ratio are reported in Tables 3 to 5. The aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test suggests that both growth 
rate and tax rates are stationary variables.  
Table 2. Unit root test for growth, tax rate and residual 
from panel regression of growth rate on tax rates 
Calculated
ADF value 
Lag length based 







-14.08** 0 -3.45 
Tax rate -4.346** 0 -3.45 
Residual -12.62** 2 -3.45 
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2010 
22
Table 3. Regression of growth rate on tax rates in 
OECD countries 
 Coefficient Std. error t-value t-prob 
Tax ratio -0.0047 0.0243 -0.1950 0.8460 
Constant 3.0289 0.9303 3.2600 0.0010 
No. of observations 434 No. of parameters 2 
Constant: yes Time dummies: 0 
Number of individuals 29 
(derived from 
year)  
Longest time series 15 [1991-2005]  
Shortest time series 14 
(unbalanced
panel)
Wald (joint): Chi^2(1) = 0.03796 [0.846] 
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(1) = 10.60 [0.001] ** 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 3.152 [0.002] ** 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = 2.288 [0.022] * 
This result also confirms that higher tax rate lowers 
the growth rate though such relation is not very 
strong and statistically insignificant. This implies 
real factors including the rate of capital formation, 
human capital and technology are more important 
for growth than the tax rates themselves as higher 
tax rates are associated with higher rate of public 
services. Negative effects of taxes are often com-
pensated by positive effects of public goods, thus, 
leaving a very small net negative impact on growth.  
Table 4. Regression of growth rate on tax rates in 
OECD countries (including time effect) 
 Coefficient Std. error t-value t-prob 
Tax ratio -0.0017 0.0218 -0.0784 0.9380 
Constant 0.9078 1.1550 0.7860 0.4320 
T1992 0.4453 0.6731 0.6620 0.5090 
T1993 0.4943 0.8687 0.5690 0.5700 
T1994 2.5328 0.8694 2.9100 0.0040 
T1995 2.4819 1.0220 2.4300 0.0160 
T1996 2.6169 0.8861 2.9500 0.0030 
T1997 3.2636 0.8364 3.9000 0.0000 
T1998 2.3037 1.0020 2.3000 0.0220 
T1999 2.7919 0.8133 3.4300 0.0010 
T2000 3.6102 0.7543 4.7900 0.0000 
T2001 1.2111 0.8772 1.3800 0.1680 
T2002 1.4863 0.8264 1.8000 0.0730 
T2003 1.3629 0.9191 1.4800 0.1390 
T2004 2.9380 0.8962 3.2800 0.0010 
T2005 2.5971 0.9287 2.8000 0.0050 
Sigma 2.5023 sigma^2 6.2616 
R^2 0.1587   
RSS 2617.3432 TSS 3111.1233 
No. of observations 434 No. of parameters 16 
Constant: yes Time dummies: 14 
Number of individuals 29 (derived from year) 
Longest time series 15 [1991-2005] 
Shortest time series 14 (unbalanced panel) 
Wald (joint): Chi^2(1) = 0.006154 [0.937] 
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(15) =180.9 [0.000] ** 
Wald (time): Chi^2(14) = 158.7 [0.000] ** 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 3.073 [0.002] ** 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = 2.309 [0.021] * 
Table 5. Regression of growth rate on tax rates in 
OECD countries(including country effects) 
 Coefficient Std. error t-value t-prob
Tax ratio -0.0132 0.0193 -0.6850 0.4940
Constant 3.9046 0.8496 4.6000 0.0000
Austria -1.1090 0.9424 -1.1800 0.2400
Belgium -1.2648 0.9782 -1.2900 0.1970
Canada -0.6339 0.8934 -0.7090 0.4780
Czech Republic -1.8299 0.9291 -1.9700 0.0500
Denmark -1.1454 0.9391 -1.2200 0.2230
Finland -1.0652 0.9554 -1.1100 0.2650
France -1.3691 0.9680 -1.4100 0.1580
Germany -1.7442 0.9216 -1.8900 0.0590
Greece -0.2546 0.9502 -0.2680 0.7890
Hungary -0.8625 0.8888 -0.9700 0.3320
Iceland -0.3296 0.8891 -0.3710 0.7110
Ireland 3.2379 0.9358 3.4600 0.0010
Italy -2.2234 0.8925 -2.4900 0.0130
Japan -2.4421 0.9378 -2.6000 0.0100
Korea 2.1868 0.8912 2.4500 0.0150
Luxembourg 1.0507 0.8924 1.1800 0.2400
Mexico -0.3717 0.8971 -0.4140 0.6790
Netherlands -1.0403 0.8906 -1.1700 0.2430
New Zealand -0.1587 0.9121 -0.1740 0.8620
Norway -0.1795 0.9048 -0.1980 0.8430
Poland 0.2156 0.9065 0.2380 0.8120
Portugal -1.1491 0.9085 -1.2600 0.2070
Slovak Republic 0.5747 0.9388 0.6120 0.5410
Spain -0.4848 0.8928 -0.5430 0.5870
Sweden -1.1999 0.8998 -1.3300 0.1830
Switzerland -2.3184 0.8915 -2.6000 0.0100
Turkey 0.5798 0.8881 0.6530 0.5140
United Kingdom -0.9124 0.9198 -0.9920 0.3220
United States -0.4294 0.8999 -0.4770 0.6330
R^2 0.2107 
Wald (joint): Chi^2(1) = 0.4686 [0.494] 
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(30) = 160.3 [0.000] ** 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 5.249 [0.000] ** 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = 0.7718 [0.440] 
Regression results reported in Table 4 support the 
proposition mentioned in the theoretical explanation 
part as country specific factors, relating to human and 
physical capital and technical progress, cause signifi-
cant variation in growth rates not the tax rates, as posi-
tive contribution public services tend to compensate 
for the negative impacts of taxes.  
Conclusion 
The OECD countries with higher tax-GDP ratio 
generally had lower growth rates compared to other 
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countries with lower size of the public sector during 
1994-2006 period. These differences have historical 
roots and result in variation in collective prefer-
ences, constraints on choices of public goods and 
services and minimum standard of social insurance 
and their willingness to pay for them. They also 
influence the degree of economic freedom of private 
sector and the role of state in economic manage-
ment. Impacts of taxes on accumulation and growth 
are assessed theoretically using neoclassical, opti-
mal growth and overlapping generation models with 
empirical support based on rank correlation, panel 
growth regression and country pair correlations of 
growth rates and tax rates among the OECD coun-
tries. Net effect of taxes on growth is negative but 
very small as positive contributions of public ser-
vices tend to counteract negative impacts of taxes. 
Real factors including the rate of capital forma-
tion, human capital and technology are more im-
portant for growth than the tax rates themselves as 
higher tax rates are associated with higher rate of 
public services. Negative effects of taxes are often 
compensated by positive effects of public goods, thus, 
leaving a very small net negative impact on growth.  
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Appendix
Table 1. Ranking by growth rates of output and the ratios of revenue and spending to GDP (OECD 2004) 
  Growth rate 1994-2004 
Revenue
ratio 
Spending ratio Rank on growth Rank on revenue Rank on spending
Ireland 7.9 35.6 34.2 28 3 2 
Korea 4.9 31.3 30.9 27 1 1 
Luxembourg 4.8 44.8 45.9 26 12 11 
Poland 4.4 40.2 45 25 6 10 
Slovak Republic 4.3 45.7 49 24 14 17 
Australia 3.7 36.6 36.2 23 4 3 
Finland 3.6 52.5 50.7 22 21 20 
Greece 3.6 46 52 21 15 21 
Hungary 3.6 44.6 48.9 20 11 16 
Iceland 3.5 48.1 47.6 19 17 13 
Spain 3.4 38.4 38.6 18 5 6 
Canada 3.4 41.7 41.1 17 10 7 
United States 3.3 31.9 36.5 16 2 4 
New Zealand 3.3 41.2 37 15 8 5 
Norway 2.9 57.9 46.4 14 22 12 
Sweden 2.8 58.3 57.3 13 23 24 
United Kingdom 2.8 40.8 43.9 12 7 8 
OECD total 2.6      
Czech Republic 2.6 41.5 44.6 10 9 9 
Portugal 2.5 45.4 48.4 9 13 14 
G7 2.5      
Netherlands 2.4 46.2 48.6 7 16 15 
France 2.3 49.8 53.4 6 20 22 
Euroarea 2.3      
Belgium 2.2 49.3 49.3 4 18 18 
EU-15 2.2      
Austria 2.1 49.3 50.6 2 18 19 
Denmark 2.1 58.9 56.3 1 24 23 
Italy 1.6 45.4 48.5 4 16 18 
Germany 1.5 43.2 46.8 3 13 15 
Switzerland 1.3 35.6 35.5 2 4 3 
Japan 1.2 30.3 38.2 1 1 7 
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Source: OECD. 
Fig. 1. Ratio of public spending to GDP among OECD countries 
Source: OECD. 
Fig. 2. Ratio of government consumption to GDP among OECD countries 
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2010 
26
Fig. 3. Ratio of social security spending to GDP among OECD countries 
Fig. 4. Ratio of revenue to GDP among OECD countries 
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Fig. 5. Ratio of revenue to GDP among OECD countries 
Fig. 6. Corporation tax among OECD countries 
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Source: OECD. 



































































































































































Fig. 8. Budget surplus and deficit among OECD countries
Table A1. Correlation in tax rates among OECD countries 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States EU15 average OECD average
Australia 1,000
Austria -0,292 1,000
Belgium 0,205 0,615 1,000
Canada -0,056 0,652 0,747 1,000
Czech Republic -0,389 0,370 -0,312 -0,018 1,000
Denmark 0,537 -0,823 -0,302 -0,506 -0,710 1,000
Finland 0,523 -0,529 0,238 0,169 -0,548 0,568 1,000
France -0,295 -0,571 -0,849 -0,460 0,013 0,333 -0,127 1,000
Germany -0,177 0,893 0,812 0,811 0,188 -0,741 -0,231 -0,685 1,000
Greece -0,458 0,859 0,473 0,752 0,505 -0,846 -0,403 -0,265 0,792 1,000
Hungary -0,357 0,248 0,374 0,400 -0,439 -0,079 -0,013 -0,023 0,437 0,304 1,000
Iceland -0,497 0,911 0,441 0,620 0,574 -0,955 -0,533 -0,404 0,806 0,901 0,138 1,000
Ireland 0,580 -0,925 -0,425 -0,575 -0,454 0,896 0,641 0,320 -0,804 -0,900 -0,315 -0,950 1,000
Italy 0,471 -0,742 -0,115 -0,217 -0,406 0,762 0,780 0,091 -0,495 -0,736 -0,116 -0,789 0,842 1,000
Japan -0,623 0,697 0,039 0,278 0,459 -0,753 -0,760 0,068 0,503 0,724 0,229 0,786 -0,855 -0,844 1,000
Korea -0,287 0,970 0,493 0,501 0,364 -0,807 -0,636 -0,484 0,802 0,811 0,193 0,878 -0,906 -0,837 0,751 1,000
Luxembourg 0,221 0,255 0,318 0,507 -0,196 0,010 0,073 0,057 0,299 0,421 0,298 0,070 -0,165 -0,125 0,061 0,245 1,000
Mexico 0,247 -0,892 -0,484 -0,405 -0,188 0,676 0,654 0,430 -0,756 -0,692 -0,244 -0,774 0,830 0,771 -0,733 -0,938 -0,287 1,000
Netherlands 0,674 -0,848 -0,351 -0,588 -0,398 0,841 0,613 0,169 -0,739 -0,911 -0,418 -0,897 0,974 0,814 -0,841 -0,816 -0,226 0,736 1,000
New Zealand 0,206 -0,939 -0,627 -0,550 -0,096 0,720 0,544 0,565 -0,847 -0,744 -0,313 -0,833 0,861 0,759 -0,655 -0,941 -0,228 0,929 0,779 1,000
Norway -0,229 -0,027 -0,250 -0,395 -0,077 0,082 -0,565 0,255 -0,068 -0,155 0,366 -0,149 -0,096 -0,235 0,183 0,048 0,000 -0,172 -0,147 -0,097 1,000
Poland 0,257 -0,846 -0,436 -0,310 -0,051 0,581 0,644 0,420 -0,649 -0,614 -0,325 -0,704 0,787 0,820 -0,692 -0,910 -0,140 0,899 0,714 0,917 -0,229 1,000
Portugal -0,544 0,765 0,255 0,618 0,392 -0,771 -0,572 -0,017 0,680 0,898 0,404 0,806 -0,892 -0,792 0,824 0,748 0,416 -0,670 -0,939 -0,683 0,182 -0,617 1,000
Slovak Republic -0,134 -0,014 0,155 0,109 -0,528 0,174 0,091 -0,061 0,091 -0,129 0,476 -0,049 -0,024 0,018 -0,027 -0,044 -0,126 -0,066 -0,077 -0,104 0,262 -0,200 0,069 1,000
Spain -0,285 0,488 0,508 0,820 0,275 -0,560 0,224 -0,336 0,627 0,655 0,341 0,572 -0,482 -0,111 0,212 0,344 0,174 -0,137 -0,507 -0,327 -0,529 -0,118 0,460 -0,088 1,000
Sweden 0,372 0,491 0,905 0,610 -0,175 -0,233 0,270 -0,907 0,713 0,266 0,136 0,310 -0,243 0,074 -0,190 0,363 0,216 -0,367 -0,134 -0,499 -0,232 -0,247 0,048 0,074 0,393 1,000
Switzerland -0,033 0,521 0,892 0,795 -0,066 -0,400 0,337 -0,729 0,748 0,540 0,313 0,500 -0,434 -0,049 0,060 0,349 0,157 -0,278 -0,404 -0,440 -0,428 -0,210 0,286 0,096 0,701 0,775 1,000
Turkey -0,643 0,370 -0,175 0,178 0,311 -0,413 -0,575 0,266 0,217 0,475 0,423 0,380 -0,506 -0,436 0,459 0,342 0,107 -0,205 -0,626 -0,286 0,409 -0,327 0,613 0,005 0,303 -0,271 -0,109 1,000
United Kingdom -0,328 -0,320 -0,656 -0,219 0,661 -0,122 -0,121 0,553 -0,391 -0,023 -0,386 -0,066 0,104 0,020 0,010 -0,326 -0,171 0,469 0,011 0,505 0,042 0,516 0,110 -0,268 0,013 -0,537 -0,347 0,323 1,000
United States 0,661 -0,786 -0,168 -0,486 -0,579 0,867 0,693 0,032 -0,632 -0,904 -0,260 -0,876 0,933 0,859 -0,885 -0,783 -0,230 0,687 0,959 0,681 -0,149 0,635 -0,954 0,062 -0,419 0,022 -0,251 -0,635 -0,186 1,000
EU15 average 0,589 -0,123 0,570 0,510 -0,432 0,274 0,839 -0,431 0,214 -0,089 0,082 -0,235 0,335 0,622 -0,609 -0,266 0,363 0,279 0,355 0,170 -0,523 0,401 -0,294 -0,011 0,420 0,660 0,565 -0,469 -0,267 0,454 1,000







































Table A2. Correlation in growth rates among OECD countries 
2002 27,7 47,1 56,3 32,1 42,9 42,6 45,9 49,8 53,6 37,7 53,7 28,4 24,5 46 30,5 16,1 33,6 17,5 37,4 19,5 38,6 42,9 36,6 42,5 39,1 47,8 30,1 42,5 31,9 29,4 42 37,5
2003 28 47,4 55,7 32 43,2 42,6 45 49,8 51,5 37,7 50,8 29,2 24,2 45 27,4 16,3 34,1 18,1 37,1 19,7 38,1 43,1 36,8 42,9 38,5 48,2 29,7 42,2 33,3 29,2 41,8 37,2
2004 28 47,5 55,4 32 43,5 41,3 44,5 49,8 53,3 38,3 51,8 29,4 26,2 45,4 27,4 17,2 34,6 16,2 38,6 20 38,1 43,3 36,8 42,5 38,7 48,4 29,4 42,8 33,4 29,1 42,1 37,4
2005 28,3 47,4 55,4 31,6 43,8 41,4 44,6 50,1 51,8 38,8 50,5 29 25,7 45,4 27,7 17,3 35,3 18,2 38,6 20,5 37,3 43,6 36,2 38,3 39 47,9 29,5 42,7 33,5 29,1 42,1 37,3
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States EU15 average OECD average
Australia 1,000
Austria -0,292 1,000
Belgium 0,205 0,615 1,000
Canada -0,056 0,652 0,747 1,000
Czech Republic -0,389 0,370 -0,312 -0,018 1,000
Denmark 0,537 -0,823 -0,302 -0,506 -0,710 1,000
Finland 0,523 -0,529 0,238 0,169 -0,548 0,568 1,000
France -0,295 -0,571 -0,849 -0,460 0,013 0,333 -0,127 1,000
Germany -0,177 0,893 0,812 0,811 0,188 -0,741 -0,231 -0,685 1,000
Greece -0,458 0,859 0,473 0,752 0,505 -0,846 -0,403 -0,265 0,792 1,000
Hungary -0,357 0,248 0,374 0,400 -0,439 -0,079 -0,013 -0,023 0,437 0,304 1,000
Iceland -0,497 0,911 0,441 0,620 0,574 -0,955 -0,533 -0,404 0,806 0,901 0,138 1,000
Ireland 0,580 -0,925 -0,425 -0,575 -0,454 0,896 0,641 0,320 -0,804 -0,900 -0,315 -0,950 1,000
Italy 0,471 -0,742 -0,115 -0,217 -0,406 0,762 0,780 0,091 -0,495 -0,736 -0,116 -0,789 0,842 1,000
Japan -0,623 0,697 0,039 0,278 0,459 -0,753 -0,760 0,068 0,503 0,724 0,229 0,786 -0,855 -0,844 1,000
Korea -0,287 0,970 0,493 0,501 0,364 -0,807 -0,636 -0,484 0,802 0,811 0,193 0,878 -0,906 -0,837 0,751 1,000
Luxembourg 0,221 0,255 0,318 0,507 -0,196 0,010 0,073 0,057 0,299 0,421 0,298 0,070 -0,165 -0,125 0,061 0,245 1,000
Mexico 0,247 -0,892 -0,484 -0,405 -0,188 0,676 0,654 0,430 -0,756 -0,692 -0,244 -0,774 0,830 0,771 -0,733 -0,938 -0,287 1,000
Netherlands 0,674 -0,848 -0,351 -0,588 -0,398 0,841 0,613 0,169 -0,739 -0,911 -0,418 -0,897 0,974 0,814 -0,841 -0,816 -0,226 0,736 1,000
New Zealand 0,206 -0,939 -0,627 -0,550 -0,096 0,720 0,544 0,565 -0,847 -0,744 -0,313 -0,833 0,861 0,759 -0,655 -0,941 -0,228 0,929 0,779 1,000
Norway -0,229 -0,027 -0,250 -0,395 -0,077 0,082 -0,565 0,255 -0,068 -0,155 0,366 -0,149 -0,096 -0,235 0,183 0,048 0,000 -0,172 -0,147 -0,097 1,000
Poland 0,257 -0,846 -0,436 -0,310 -0,051 0,581 0,644 0,420 -0,649 -0,614 -0,325 -0,704 0,787 0,820 -0,692 -0,910 -0,140 0,899 0,714 0,917 -0,229 1,000
Portugal -0,544 0,765 0,255 0,618 0,392 -0,771 -0,572 -0,017 0,680 0,898 0,404 0,806 -0,892 -0,792 0,824 0,748 0,416 -0,670 -0,939 -0,683 0,182 -0,617 1,000
Slovak Republic -0,134 -0,014 0,155 0,109 -0,528 0,174 0,091 -0,061 0,091 -0,129 0,476 -0,049 -0,024 0,018 -0,027 -0,044 -0,126 -0,066 -0,077 -0,104 0,262 -0,200 0,069 1,000
Spain -0,285 0,488 0,508 0,820 0,275 -0,560 0,224 -0,336 0,627 0,655 0,341 0,572 -0,482 -0,111 0,212 0,344 0,174 -0,137 -0,507 -0,327 -0,529 -0,118 0,460 -0,088 1,000
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